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Abstract 
 
The sovereign debt crisis served to highlight the limitations of trying to use a Union budget in 
which all Member States participate to perform functions corresponding to a monetary union in 
which not all Member States participate. In this context, a debate has arisen about whether the 
Eurozone should rather have its own budget, separate from the Union budget. There are good 
arguments to support the view that a new budgetary capacity should be developed at European 
level to support the monetary union, but this paper defends the view that it is preferable to develop 
such a capacity within the Union budget, or, to the extent that this is not yet feasible, to keep it as 
closely aligned to the Union budget as possible. In this respect, the Commission’s latest EMU and 
MFF proposals are a welcome first step in seeking to pursue such an integrative approach, within 
the constraints of the current Treaties. Looking to the future, a European public finance convention 
could be considered to prepare more ambitious reforms, including targeted treaty revisions, for 
adoption in the 2020s. 
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Introduction 
The impulse for the creation of both the economic and monetary union (EMU) and the Union’s unique 
budgetary system originated almost 50 years ago in the same landmark summit of Heads of State or 
Government at The Hague in 1969. At that time, progress towards EMU and the development of a 
federal-style European budget, which would also perform an economic stabilisation function, were 
perceived as intertwined objectives. By the time European Council President Van Rompuy launched 
the idea of a fiscal capacity for the Eurozone in Autumn 2012, however, the debates on the budgetary 
dimension of EMU, on the one hand, and the development of the Union budget of 28 Member States, 
on the other, had become disconnected. This paper argues that it is time to reconnect those debates.  
At present, the Union’s public finances are in a state of flux and transition. The legal framework 
governing the Union budget of 28 - soon to be 27 - Member States is too rigid to easily accommodate 
the differentiated public finance solutions required for the Eurozone, while the proliferation over the 
past decade of intergovernmental or quasi-intergovernmental Eurozone-specific mechanisms around 
the Union framework has entailed a fragmentation of the European-level public finances. To borrow 
from Deirdre Curtin’s famous critique of the Maastricht Treaty, the Union’s public finances appear to 
be made up of ‘bits and pieces’.1 In this context, it may be tempting to imagine that a way forward for 
the Eurozone could consist in simply making a clean break and starting again from scratch with the 
creation of a separate Eurozone budget, accompanied by new institutional structures.  
However, such an initiative appears neither politically feasible nor desirable, most especially since it 
would intensify divisions between Member States at a moment when one country is already leaving 
the Union. Following UK withdrawal, the Eurozone will represent 85% of EU GNI and 76% of the 
Union’s population,2 and all but one of the remaining non-Eurozone Member States have a legal 
obligation to join the single currency. The idea of a Eurozone budget may have its merits, but the 
Union already has a budget, which should also serve as the budget of the EMU. Pending the 
enlargement of the Eurozone to encompass all, or almost all, the Member States, it is preferable to 
develop any new Eurozone budgetary capacity within the Union budget, or, if this is not yet feasible, 
in close alignment to it. In this regard, the Commission’s proposals for EMU reform of 6 December 
2017 and its proposals for the post-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF), due on 2 May 2018, 
represent welcome first steps in seeking to pursue an integrative approach, whereby a new Eurozone 
capacity should, as far as possible, be financed through a line in the Union budget.  
Against that background, this paper first traces the origins of the debate on a budget or fiscal capacity 
for the Eurozone, before going on to highlight the main legal and institutional constraints that must 
be taken into account when seeking to establish Eurozone-specific mechanisms within the Union 
budget under the current Treaties. In light of those constraints, it will be suggested that any Eurozone 
capacity created in the current round of reforms is likely to be modest in scale and scope. Looking to 
the future, it will be suggested that the current round of reforms should be followed by a longer-term 
reflection, possibly through a targeted European public finance convention, on the future public 
finance architecture of the Union and the EMU. Such a convention could provide the impulse for a 
further package of reforms, including targeted treaty revisions, to be implemented during the 2020s. 
The budgetary dimension of EMU 
                                                          
1 Deirdre Curtin, 'The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces', 30 Common Market 
Law Review (1993) pp. 17–69. 
2 See Guntram Wolff, ‘Eurozone or EU budget? Confronting a complex political question’, Bruegel blog post, 29 
June 2017: http://bruegel.org/2017/06/eurozone-or-eu-budget-confronting-a-complex-political-question/. 
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Early reflections on the budgetary dimension of EMU focused on two main issues, namely the size of 
the European budget needed to support the EMU, and the appropriate level of influence of European 
institutions over the national budgets of the Member States. The Werner Report of 19703 envisaged 
an enhanced role for the Community budget in the EMU, but also acknowledged that ‘its economic 
significance will still be weak compared with that of the national budgets, the harmonized 
management of which will be an essential feature of cohesion in the union.’4 Indeed, the Werner 
Report cautioned against ‘excessive centralisation’ of budget policy and noted that the distribution of 
powers ‘must allow for a differentiated budgetary structure operating at several levels, Community, 
national etc.’5 Moreover, ‘[i]n view of the fact that the role of the Community budget as an economic 
instrument will be insufficient, the Community’s centre of decision must be in a position to influence 
the national budgets, especially as regards the level and the direction of the balances and the methods 
for financing the deficits or utilizing the surpluses.’6  
The Marjolin Report on EMU of 1975,7 which is as doom-laden as any report written during the crises 
of the past decade in its discussion of ‘the urgent problems which endanger the existence of the 
European Community’,8 advocated ‘the establishment of a Community budget on such a scale that 
the important transfers which the maintenance of EMU will require can take place and be financed 
out of Community taxation.’9 The report bemoaned the minute size of the Community’s budget (0.5% 
of EEC GDP in 1973), which it considered to be an impediment to the creation of an EMU.10 The 
MacDougall report of 1977 on the role of public finance in European integration11 went a step further 
and sought to quantify the size of the Community budget that would be required to accompany the 
future EMU. It was estimated that a Community budget of the order of 5-7% of Community GDP ‘could 
provide sufficient geographical equalisation of productivity, living standards and cushioning of 
temporary fluctuations to support a monetary union.’12  
The Delors Report on EMU of 198813 remained silent on the possible need to expand the size and 
functions of the Community budget following the transition to EMU, although the Delors Commission 
did simultaneously push for the establishment of a Cohesion Fund to tackle economic and social 
disparities between the Member States. Above all, the Delors Report prioritised the surveillance and 
coordination of national economic and budgetary policies,14 and the Maastricht Treaty would pursue 
this same approach. As it transpired, not all Member States would participate from the outset in the 
monetary union. Furthermore, a practice would develop in the context of the seven-yearly MFF 
negotiations of setting a cap on expenditure at just over 1% of EU GNI. The full consequences of these 
choices would only become evident years later, when the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis struck.   
                                                          
3 Report to the Council and the Commission on the realisation by stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the 
Community (Werner Report), Luxembourg, 8 October 1970.  
4 Ibid, p. 10-11. 
5 Ibid, p. 11. 
6 Ibid, p. 12-13. 
7 Report of the Study Group ‘Economic and Monetary Union 1980’ (Marjolin Report), Brussels, 8 March 1975. 
8 Ibid, Preface, p. II. 
9 Ibid, p. 6. 
10 Ibid, p. 32. 
11 Report of the Study Group on the role of public finance in European integration (MacDougall Report), Brussels, 
April 1977.  
12 Ibid, p. 14. 
13 Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community (Delors Report), Brussels, June 1988. 
14 Ibid, p. 20. 
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It was clear from the early stages of the crisis in 2010 that the limited legal options available under the 
Union Treaties to create dedicated Eurozone rescue mechanisms, the rigid legal framework governing 
the Union budget of 28 Member States and the constraints of the own resources and MFF ceilings 
would make recourse to rapid intergovernmental financing solutions a more attractive option for the 
Eurozone Member States. Deliberations at high-profile Euro Summits and Eurogroup meetings 
provided the impulse for the creation of intergovernmental Eurozone rescue mechanisms, the 
adoption of an intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU, and 
the elaboration of Union legislation which strengthened surveillance over the management of national 
budgets. Not surprisingly, voices also started to emerge in favour of pushing further to create a 
Eurozone budget or fiscal capacity, possibly together with a Eurozone treasury and finance minister, 
and even a dedicated Eurozone parliamentary body.15  
This debate acquired a particular momentum from October 2012, when President Van Rompuy 
presented to the European Council an Interim Report of the Four Presidents which introduced the 
notion of a ‘fiscal capacity’ for the Eurozone.16 Having recalled the progress already made in 
strengthening the rule-based framework for fiscal policies in the EMU, the Interim Report observed 
that strengthening discipline alone is not sufficient. It would also be necessary, in the longer term, to 
strengthen economic governance by developing a fiscal capacity for the EMU.17 Such a fiscal capacity 
‘would support new fiscal functions which are not covered by the multiannual financial framework’.18 
In particular, one of its functions ‘could be to facilitate adjustments to country specific shocks by 
providing for some degree of absorption at the central level’.19  
Since then, numerous official reports have advocated the creation of a Eurozone fiscal capacity, 
without providing clear details on what form such a capacity should take. The Interim Report of 2012 
was followed by a resolution of the European Parliament,20 the Commission’s Blueprint for a deep and 
genuine EMU,21 and the final report of the Four Presidents,22 all of which advocated the creation of a 
Eurozone shock-absorption function at the central level. Similarly, the Five President’s Report (this 
time including the President of the Parliament) of June 2015 proposed, inter alia, the introduction of 
a fiscal stabilisation function for the Eurozone, noting that ‘all mature Monetary Unions have put in 
place a common macroeconomic stabilisation function to better deal with shocks that cannot be 
managed at the national level alone.’23  
                                                          
15 An early and influential report raising these ideas was presented in 2012 by Jean Arthuis, now Chair of the 
European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets, upon the request of the French Prime Minister. See Jean Arthuis, 
‘Avenir de la zone euro : l’intégration politique ou le chaos’, March 2012. Report available online at 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/124000129/index.shtml. 
16 Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, (Interim) Report by Herman Van Rompuy, in collaboration 
with the Presidents of the Commission, the Eurogroup and the ECB, Brussels, 12 October 2012. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid, p. 5. 
19 Ibid.  
20 European Parliament resolution of 20 November 2012 with recommendations to the Commission on the 
report of the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the ECB and the Eurogroup 
‘Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, P7_TA(2012)0430. 
21 Communication from the Commission, ‘A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union 
Launching a European Debate’, COM(2012) 777, Brussels, 30 November 2012. 
22 Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, (Final) Report by Herman Van Rompuy, in collaboration 
with the Presidents of the Commission, the Eurogroup and the ECB, Brussels, 5 December, 2012. 
23 Ibid, point 4.2. 
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Meanwhile, outside the institutions, a whole host of academics, think-tanks and groupings of 
intellectuals have contributed to the debate.24 Several of these initiatives have advocated a separate 
budget and institutions for the Eurozone. For example, the draft Treaty Democratizing Euro Area 
Governance (T-Dem), published by a group of French intellectuals, including economist Thomas 
Piketty, envisages the creation of a separate Eurozone budget financed by revenue from corporation 
tax, which would in time be incorporated into the Union framework following future treaty revisions. 
However, European political leaders have for the most part shied away from such radical proposals. 
The most notable exception is of course French President Macron, who in the early stages of his 
presidency called for the creation of a fully-fledged Eurozone budget, worth several percentage points 
of Eurozone GDP.25 In contrast, Commission President Juncker used his State of the Union speech in 
September 2017 to propose the creation of a ‘Eurozone budget line’ within the Union budget.26  
Mr Juncker’s proposal was consistent with the Commission’s Reflection Paper on the Deepening of 
the EMU,27 which envisages the development of a Eurozone capacity within the Union framework. 
The Reflection Paper presents a Eurozone stabilisation function as part of a broader toolbox, including 
funds from the Union budget and economic policy coordination mechanisms, which should be 
developed as part of a renewed economic convergence process within the Eurozone. It is suggested 
that a Eurozone budgetary capacity to counter an asymmetric shock affecting a single Eurozone 
Member State, but threatening the stability of the Eurozone as a whole, could take the form of a 
European investment protection scheme, a European unemployment scheme or a rainy day fund.28 
The Reflection Paper envisages that such a stabilisation function should be fully operational by 2025.29  
The Commission’s signal that it intends to present a proposal for a Eurozone economic stabilisation 
function as part of its MFF package in May 2018 has been welcomed with enthusiasm in some 
quarters, for example by the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund,30 but has also 
been met with scepticism in certain national capitals, notably in the Netherlands and in other smaller 
northern countries.31 Some economic experts question whether a stabilisation function is needed at 
all,32 while it appears some governments might be more open to a Eurozone capacity concentrated 
                                                          
24 See, for example, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Erkki Vihriälä, Guntram Wolff, ‘Options for a euro-area fiscal capacity’, 
Bruegel Policy Contribution No 2013/01, January 2013; Eulalia Rubio, ‘Budget de la zone euro : trois fonctions, 
trois instruments’, Revue de l’Union européenne, No 567, April 2013, pp. 214-217; Glienicker Gruppe, ‘Aufbruch 
in die Euro-Union’, Die Zeit, 17 October 2013; Groupe Eiffel, ‘Pour une Communauté politique de l’euro’, Le 
Monde, 13 February 2014; Eulalia Rubio, ‘Fédéraliser la zone euro : vers un veritable budget européen ?’, Notre 
Europe Policy Paper No 155, January 2016; Stéphanie Hennette, Thomas Piketty, Guillaume Sacriste, Antoine 
Vauchez, Pour un traité de démocratisation de la zone euro (T-Dem), Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2017 ; Guntram 
Wolff, ‘Beyond the Juncker and Schäuble visions of euro-area governance’, Bruegel Policy Brief No 6/2017, 
November 2017; 14 French & German economists, ‘Reconciling risk sharing with market discipline: A 
constructive approach to  euro area reform’, CEPR Policy Insight No 91, January 2018. 
25 ‘Macron calls for powerful Eurozone budget’, EU Observer, 31 August 2017: 
https://euobserver.com/economic/138841  
26 Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union Address to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 13 September 2017. 
27 Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union, Brussels, 31 May 2017. 
28 On the respective merits of these different options, see Guntram Wolff, supra, note 2. 
29 See Reflection Paper, supra, note 27, Annex I. 
30 Christine Lagarde, ‘A Compass to Prosperity: The Next Steps of Euro Area Economic Integration’, Speech at 
the German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin, 26 March 2018. 
31 See, for example, Mark Rutte, ‘Underpromise and overdeliver: fulfilling the promise of Europe’, Speech at the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, Berlin, 2 March 2018. See also the Joint Statement on EMU issued by the Finance Ministers 
of Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Sweden on 6 March 2018. 
32 See, for example, Adriaan Schout, ‘The EMU does not have any flaws: A Critique of the European Commission’s 
Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the EMU’, Clingendael Institute Article, November 2017. 
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on providing support for investments and structural reforms rather than performing an economic 
stabilisation function.33 Even if sufficient political support does emerge to establish a new Eurozone 
capacity, however, a number of legal and institutional constraints will in any event limit what can be 
achieved within the current Union framework. These constraints are explored in the next section. 
Legal and institutional constraints 
In some respects, the current period in the development of the Union’s public finances is reminiscent 
of the era of the ‘third pillar’ in justice and home affairs, with intergovernmental and hybrid (Union 
and Member State) financing mechanisms and procedures co-existing alongside the core Union 
budget. As in the case of the old third pillar, this state of affairs may be viewed negatively, as 
undermining the unity of the Union’s public finance framework, or it may also be viewed in a more 
positive light as a necessary transitional phase in a highly sensitive policy domain, which should 
ultimately culminate in the ‘communitarisation’ of the funds and mechanisms concerned, following 
future revision of the Treaties.  
In the meantime, it is necessary to find pragmatic solutions to overcome the problems that arise on 
account of the non-uniform participation of Member States in the monetary union and in the Union 
budget. In this regard, the Commission’s intention to propose a dedicated stabilisation capacity for 
the Eurozone, financed through a Eurozone line in the Union budget, will provide an interesting case 
study. It is not yet clear how exactly the proposal will be structured, but it is clear from the outset that 
a number of legal and institutional challenges will have to be overcome. This section draws attention 
to a few of the most obvious constraints.34 
In the first instance, it will be necessary to find a legal basis in the Treaties for the legal act establishing 
such a Eurozone capacity. In accordance with Article 310(3) TFEU, the implementation of any 
expenditure shown in the Union budget requires the prior adoption of a binding legal act 
corresponding to that expenditure. In accordance with the Court’s case-law, the appropriate legal 
basis for an act is determined in light of its aim and content.35 Depending on which of the various 
options for a Eurozone capacity is pursued - such as a stabilisation capacity taking the form of an 
investment protection scheme, a rainy day fund or an unemployment reinsurance scheme, or a 
mechanism of contractual arrangements to support investments and structural reforms - a legal basis 
would have to be sought that corresponds to the aim and content of the proposed instrument. 
For example, to establish a capacity focused on investments and structural reforms, it might be 
interesting to explore possibilities for relying on an industry policy basis (Article 173(3) TFEU) or a 
social and economic cohesion policy basis (Article 175(3) TFEU), possibly in conjunction with Article 
352 TFEU. In conformity with the principle of conferral, the scope of action of any Eurozone capacity 
would be restricted by the scope of the corresponding legal basis. Moreover, representatives of all 
the Member States in the Union institutions would take part in the decision-making process leading 
                                                          
33 The German coalition agreement of 7 February 2018 sees a Eurozone capacity as ‘a point of departure for an 
investment budget for the Eurozone.’ 
34 The analysis that follows was drafted having had the benefit of hearing the presentation of Andrea Westerhof-
Löfflerová, entitled ‘How could a fiscal capacity for the Eurozone relate to the EU budget?’, at the ERA seminar 
on ‘The Future of EU Finances Post-Brexit’, Brussels, 26 February 2018. See also Luca Lionello, ‘Establishing a 
budgetary capacity in the Eurozone: Recent proposals and legal challenges’, Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law, 24(6), 2017, pp. 822-842; David Martinez Garcia & Paolo Vacca, ‘Strengthening and deepening 
the EMU within the current Treaties: possibilities and limits’, EUF Policy Brief No 1/2015; René Repasi, ‘Legal 
options for an additional EMU fiscal capacity’, Study for DG IPOL, European Parliament, January 2013. 
35 Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide), C-300/89, EU:C:1991:244, point 10. 
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to the establishment of the Eurozone capacity. The legal options to get around the participation of 
representatives of every Member State in the decision-making process are limited. The specific 
Eurozone legal basis of Article 136 TFEU concerns mainly economic coordination and surveillance of 
national budgets, and thus does not appear to provide an appropriate legal basis for a central capacity. 
It is also questionable whether it would be appropriate to establish a dedicated Eurozone capacity 
through an enhanced cooperation under Article 20 TEU, not least since enhanced cooperation is a last-
resort mechanism which must remain open to the participation of all Member States. 
If a legal basis can be found in the Treaties, past experience suggests that various possibilities then 
exist for the financing of a Eurozone capacity. In line with the preference of Mr Juncker, it would be 
possible to create a line in the Union budget corresponding to the legal act establishing the capacity. 
The necessary appropriations could be entered on this line on an annual basis through the annual 
budgetary procedure of Article 314, which again would necessarily imply the participation of 
representatives of all Member States. The capacity could also take the form of a permanent fund, 
which would be built up over time through annual contributions from the Union budget, following the 
model of the European Fund for Strategic Investments Guarantee Fund.36 Once the threshold amount 
for provisioning the permanent Eurozone fund is reached after a number of years, any shortfall 
resulting from fund’s investments would thereafter be replenished on an annual basis through the 
Union budget line, while any surpluses arising from returns flowing back to the fund would be 
transferred back to that line in the Union budget.  
In accordance with the principle of budgetary universality, the corresponding Union budget revenue 
under either of these scenarios would ordinarily be drawn from the common pot of Union revenue, 
to which all Member States contribute. It can be expected that the non-Eurozone Member States 
would resist having to contribute to a capacity that only benefits the Eurozone. Nevertheless, Article 
311 TFEU is formulated in a broad manner and appears to leave a large room for manoeuvre to the 
Council in shaping the system of own resources. Article 311 TFEU does not appear to exclude, prima 
facie, a system in which revenue is not collected in a uniform manner across all Member States. 
Indeed, the current system of rebates and corrections already represents a form of differentiation 
between Member States on the revenue side of the budget, even if those rebates and corrections are 
subject to frequent criticism, notably by the European Parliament, for precisely that reason. The 
possibility of revising the Own Resources Decision to create dedicated resources for a Eurozone 
capacity, such as the seignorage income of the European Central Bank, could also be explored.37  
If a substantive reform of the Own Resources Decision is not feasible, another possibility to allow only 
the Eurozone Member States to contribute revenue for the capacity could be to rely on the derogation 
from the principle of universality provided for in Article 21 of the Financial Regulation, namely external 
assigned revenue.38 The external assigned revenue method is used mainly in the fields of research and 
external aid to allow individual Member States to contribute additional amounts to specific Union 
actions.39 The appropriations are not authorised through the annual budgetary procedure of Article 
                                                          
36 Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the EP and of the Council of 25 June 2015 on the European Fund for Strategic 
Investments, OJ 2015, L 169/1, Articles 12-13. 
37 As suggested in the Final Report of the Monti High Level Group on Own Resources, January 2017, pp. 56 and 
68. 
38 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the EP and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules 
applicable to the general budget of the Union, OJ 2012 L 298/1. 
39 In order to allow the Eurozone Member States to make contributions to a Eurozone capacity as external 
assigned revenue, it may also be necessary to amend the Financial Regulation to add these contributions to the 
list of instances of external assigned revenue laid down in Article 21(2) of the Financial Regulation. 
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314 TFEU, but are contributed directly to a given item of expenditure on a voluntary basis by the 
contributing Member State. The Eurozone Member States could conclude an agreement between 
themselves in which they would undertake to contribute pre-defined amounts to a Eurozone capacity 
as external assigned revenue. However, in contrast to own resources, the Commission would have 
few powers of enforcement if Member States do not make their agreed payments on time. Moreover, 
since the appropriations are not authorised by the budgetary authority, the European Parliament 
would be excluded from decision-making on the allocation of the funds.  
Another option for a Eurozone capacity could be to establish a guarantee-based mechanism backed 
by the Union budget, which might have no paid-in capital but which would have a borrowing capacity. 
Following the model of the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the capacity could be 
guaranteed up to the own resources ceiling, with the necessary contributions being called up from the 
Member States as needs arise. Pro memoria budget lines could be created on the revenue and 
expenditure sides of the Union budget for the entry of any appropriations called up from the Member 
States pursuant to a call on the guarantee. However, two main difficulties arise with this approach. 
First of all, a guarantee backed by the Union budget would imply that all Member States, including 
non-Eurozone Member States, would have to contribute in the event of a call on the guarantee. This 
issue already arose in 2015 with regard to EFSM bridge-financing to Greece, when the non-Eurozone 
Member States insisted on introducing a provision into the EFSM Regulation which would require 
intergovernmental compensation from the Eurozone Member States in the event that they would 
have to make additional contributions to the Union budget following a call on the guarantee.40 The 
second difficulty is that such an approach may require a higher own resources ceiling, which would be 
politically difficult to agree in the context of UK withdrawal.  
It follows that there are no especially straightforward options for the establishment of a Eurozone 
capacity within the current legal framework governing the Union budget. First of all, the scope of 
action of any such capacity will be restricted by the scope of the legal basis chosen. Furthermore, 
representatives of non-Eurozone Member States will most likely have to participate in the decision-
making procedure leading to the establishment of the capacity, although this may not prove an 
insurmountable political obstacle if a proposal for a Eurozone capacity is presented as part of a 
package together with new initiatives to support the non-Eurozone Member States. As for the 
financing, non-Eurozone Member States will almost certainly resist incurring any financial liability for 
a capacity that only benefits the Eurozone Member States. There are ways around this, such as the 
use of external assigned revenue, but they deviate from the standard budgetary procedure laid down 
in Article 314 TFEU and cannot be considered ideal. In order to create dedicated resources for the 
Eurozone, moreover, a fundamental reform of the Own Resources Decision would be required.  
In addition to these legal and institutional constraints, it is also necessary to take account of the 
political context. Faced with the uncertainties accompanying the expected loss of UK contributions to 
the Union budget, and given the relatively tight calendar for concluding a deal on the next MFF by 
2020 at the latest, the negotiating parties already appear to be shying away from any ambitious reform 
of the MFF and own resources system. Instead, there are indications that they will aim towards a result 
which would maintain the global MFF ceiling at just over 1% of EU GNI, possibly with a small increase,41 
while keeping support for core Union policies at amounts as close as possible to current levels for the 
                                                          
40 See Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1360 of 4 August 2015 amending Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 establishing 
a European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, OJ 2015, L 210/1, Article 1. 
41 The European Commission has indicated it will propose a post-2020 MFF of 1.1(x)% of EU GNI. 
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EU27.42 As a result, the amounts available to finance a Eurozone capacity within the next MFF are 
likely to be modest, and even a Eurozone capacity of modest volume would be difficult to squeeze 
under the anticipated MFF ceilings without necessitating corresponding cuts to other Union policies. 
In light of these considerations, it might be no surprise if any Eurozone capacity ultimately agreed in 
the current round of reforms would have some form of hybrid nature, possibly combining a legal basis 
in the Union Treaties with a more intergovernmental mode of financing – which would be counted 
outside the own resources and MFF ceilings - similar to the Single Resolution Fund in the banking 
union.43 The Eurozone Member States might even wish to establish a Eurozone capacity on an fully 
intergovernmental basis, although the European Parliament would no doubt raise objections and 
could draw a political link with its consent for the MFF. In any event, it cannot be excluded that the 
creation of a new Eurozone capacity might lead to an expansion of the ‘galaxy’ of intergovernmental 
and hybrid funds and instruments around the Union budget.44 Against that background, it is clear that 
the process of reform will in any event have to be carried forward beyond the forthcoming MFF 
negotiations and into the 2020s. The final section explores how this might best be done. 
Towards a European public finance convention? 
When they assembled at The Hague in 1969, the Heads of State and Government deliberated around 
the themes of ‘completion, enlargement and deepening’ of the Community project.45 The 
Community’s public finances were central to the debates on all three themes. As a core element of 
completion, the leaders agreed progressively to replace the financing of the Community budget from 
national contributions with a system of own resources.46 The imminent enlargement of the 
Community to new Member States like the UK, which could be expected to resist budgetary reform, 
created added urgency in this regard.47 In parallel, it was agreed that the budgetary powers of the 
European Parliament would be strengthened and it was noted that the Council would continue to 
study options for direct elections to that institution. Under the theme of deepening, meanwhile, the 
leaders called for a plan to be drawn up for a staged transition to EMU. 
As we approach the 50th anniversary of the Hague Summit in December 2019, by which time a deal on 
the post-2020 MFF should ideally have been concluded, it may be worthwhile to reflect on how the 
process of reform might be carried forward into the 2020s. In particular, the targeted approach to 
public finance reform pursued in the early to mid-70s on the basis of the Hague Communiqué could 
provide an interesting precedent for our times. The Hague Summit was followed by a series of targeted 
but significant reforms, not all of which involved treaty change, including the adoption of the first Own 
Resources Decision in 1970, the targeted Treaties of Luxembourg (1970) and Brussels (1975), and the 
                                                          
42 The European Parliament, in its resolution of 14 March 2018 on ‘Preparing the Parliament’s position on the 
MFF post-2020’ (P8_TA(2018)0075), calls for a post-2020 MFF of 1.3% of EU GNI, with cohesion and agriculture 
funding to be maintained at current levels for the EU27. 
43 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the EP and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a 
uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a 
Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund, OJ 2014, L 225/1, Article 67. 
44 Richard Crowe, ‘The European Budgetary Galaxy’, European Constitutional Law Review, 13: 428–452, 2017; 
Peter Becker, ‘The next Multiannual Financial Framework and the Unity of EU Budget’, Study for DG IPOL, 
European Parliament, November 2017. 
45 Richard T. Griffiths, ‘A Dismal Decade? European Integration in the 1970s’ in Desmond Dinan, Origins and 
Evolution of the European Union, Oxford, 2006, pp. 169-190 at pp. 172-173.  
46 Communiqué of the meeting of Heads of State or Government of the Member States at The Hague (1 and 2 
December 1969), point 5. 
47 Richard T. Griffiths, supra, note 45. 
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adoption of the European Electoral Act in 1976. Similarly, targeted amendments to the treaty 
provisions governing the EMU and the Union budget, ratified in preference by national parliaments, 
could open the way for significant advances in creating a more coherent public finance architecture 
for the Eurozone and the Union in the 2020s.  
In order to prepare such reforms, the possibility of convening a targeted European public finance 
convention could be considered. In formal terms, a convention convened on the basis of Article 48(3) 
TEU should examine specific proposals for revision of the Treaties, but there appears to be no legal 
obstacle to enlarging the mandate of a convention to cover also other matters that do not necessarily 
require treaty revision. In that light, a European public finance convention could be mandated to 
conduct a global deliberation on the interconnected issues of Union budget reform, reform of the 
EMU (including surveillance and coordination of national budgets) and democratic oversight of the 
European public finances.48 It could examine possibilities not only for targeted treaty revisions, by full 
or simplified revision procedures, but also reforms on other matters - such as a restructuring of the 
own resources system or the abolition of the cap on Union expenditure at just over 1% of EU GNI - 
which do not require treaty revision, but which are nevertheless so fundamental that they warrant a 
considered deliberation of sufficient duration among representatives of Union citizens at various 
levels of governance, including – importantly - representatives of national parliaments, who remain 
the custodians of their national public finances.  
Following the departure of the Member State where the very legitimacy of Europe’s public finances is 
most frequently contested, the question for the remaining Member States today is not so much 
whether European-level finances are necessary, but rather how the European system of public finance 
in a global sense should be organised, bearing in mind the transitional challenge of non-uniform 
participation of Member States in the single currency and in the Union budget. An open and 
representative deliberation in a public finance convention could even serve a cathartic function in the 
post-sovereign debt crisis Union. During the crisis, divergent narratives of European public finance 
developed, notably between the wealthier northern Member States, where many felt they were being 
forced to take on the risks of a profligate south, and the southern Member States, where many 
perceived themselves as victims of austerity imposed by northern countries who had designed the 
EMU to benefit their own interests. These resentments persist and have not yet been given a 
constructive pan-European forum for expression, apart from occasional high-profile debates in the 
European Parliament.49 Instead, they are expressed through votes for anti-establishment candidates 
in national elections. A convention would certainly not be a panacea in this regard, but it might help. 
As far as the post-2020 calendar is concerned, it is striking that the Commission’s proposals of 6 
December 2017 on EMU are based on a roadmap for reform running up to 2025, whereas the 
Commission will almost certainly propose a post-2020 MFF running up to 2027. Ideally, the calendars 
for reform of the EMU and of the Union budget should be aligned, with a view to facilitating a global 
approach to the budgetary dimension of EMU and reform of the Union budget. In light of the 
uncertainties associated with UK withdrawal from the Union, one option in this regard could be to 
treat the forthcoming post-2020 MFF as a shorter, five-year, ‘transitional’ MFF to get over the period 
of UK withdrawal. A package of targeted reforms could then be prepared by a convention in the early-
                                                          
48 The idea of a European public finance convention has been advocated in the past by Alain Lamassoure MEP, 
notably when he was Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets during the negotiations on the 
2014-20 MFF. 
49 Notably the debate following the address of Greek Prime Minister Tsipras to the European Parliament on 8 
July 2015, when the conflicting narratives of north and south were passionately aired in a single chamber.  
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2020s, with a view to a coordinated entry into force of reforms to the EMU and to the Union budget 
at the start of a post-2025 programming period.  
Alternatively, if a seven-year MFF is maintained, coordinated reforms could also be introduced 
together with a mid-term revision of the post-2020 MFF. As Iain Begg has pointed out, the true 
budgetary impact of UK withdrawal may only be felt around the mid-point of the next MFF, when UK 
payments to settle the commitments entered into during the 2014-20 period will cease.50 For that 
reason, a significant mid-term revision of the post-2020 MFF may anyway be desirable.  
A European public finance convention would be composed of representatives coming from all 27 
Member States, but special arrangements could be made within its structures for the composition of 
organs deliberating on Eurozone-specific issues. To the extent that they may not have already been 
resolved in the current round of negotiations, possible themes to be addressed by a future convention 
could include: 
 Eurozone economic stabilisation: Is an ambitious Eurozone stabilisation function necessary? 
If so, how might it be given a secure legal foundation in the Treaties and within the Union 
budget? Could a targeted treaty amendment be considered, for example to introduce a 
dedicated legal basis? 
 Risk-sharing in the Eurozone: Is it necessary and how should it be pursued? Are targeted treaty 
revisions needed?; 
 Eurozone assistance mechanisms: What future legal status and role for the European Stability 
Mechanism / European Monetary Fund? What form of parliamentary oversight? What 
relationship to the Union budget?; 
 Eurozone accession support: Are any reforms needed to facilitate the adoption of the euro by 
all Member States?; 
 Reform of the own resources system: Should a distinction be drawn between Union and 
Eurozone own resources, thereby allowing for dedicated Eurozone mechanisms to be 
financed through their own resources within the Union budget? Should new own resources 
be introduced? What amendments should be made to the Own Resources Decision?; 
 Expenditure priorities: Which priorities are best financed at Eurozone or Union level and which 
at national level? Is the current profile of Union expenditure appropriate? Is the traditional 
cap on Union expenditure at just over 1% of EU GNI appropriate and should it be maintained?; 
 Surveillance and coordination of national budgets: Are current rules and mechanisms 
adequate and appropriate? Is the current European Semester process effective? How might 
it be improved? How could the parliamentary dimension (European and national) be 
enhanced? Would targeted treaty revisions be desirable or are legislative revisions sufficient?; 
 Institutions: Is it necessary to adapt current institutional arrangements to allow for Eurozone-
specific composition of institutions when deciding on Eurozone-specific matters? Is there a 
need for a central treasury and finance minister? Or other new Eurozone bodies? Are any 
treaty amendments needed in relation to existing Union public finance institutions, such as 
the European Central Bank, the Court of Auditors, the European Investment Bank?; 
 Democratic oversight of the Eurozone and Union finances: What improvements are desirable? 
Are new structures needed or should existing structures be changed? 
                                                          
50 See Iain Begg, ‘The EU’s Finances: can the economically desirable and the politically feasible be reconciled?’, 
Paper presented at the EUI School of Transnational Governance / College of Europe event ‘The New EU Multi-
Annual Financial Framework’, Bruges, 30 November 2017. 
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The latest EMU and MFF proposals of the Commission are a welcome first step in pursuing a more 
global approach to the European public finances and they provide a sound basis from which to chart 
a course towards a more coherent and comprehensible European public finance architecture, 
including dedicated Eurozone instruments within the Union budget. Ultimately, however, there is only 
so much that can be done within the constraints of the current Treaties and targeted treaty revisions 
will one day be required. A European public finance convention could serve as a useful format in which 
to carry forward the reflections on EMU and Union budget reform into the 2020s.  
